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Throwing the Testimony Out with the Bathwater: 
Washington’s Application of Crawford Hearsay in 
Child Abuse Cases 
Laura Harmon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lisa Burgess and her one-year-old daughter began living with Steven 
Beadle in October of 2004.1 Almost two years later, the girl told her mother 
about discomfort in her genital area and began frequently drawing pictures 
of male genitalia.2 Her mother immediately confronted Beadle, causing the 
girl to cry.3 Beadle screamed at the girl, “[D]o you love daddy[?]” and 
“[D]addy’s going away to prison for life if you say something like this to 
anybody.”4 
Shortly afterwards, Beadle was sent to prison for a crime unrelated to the 
molestation accusation.5 A few months later, the girl started drawing male 
genitalia again, calling them “tails.”6 When Lisa asked about the drawings, 
the girl would crumple up the paper and throw it away.7 The girl told her 
                                                                                                                              
 
* JD Candidate 2014, Seattle University School of Law; BA Occidental College, 2011. I 
would like to thank everyone on the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for all of their help 
on this article and my family and friends for their support. Any mistakes are my own. 
1 Petition for Review at 3, State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011) (No. 37508-7-II), 
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/842043%20prv.pdf. 
2 State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 866 (Wash. 2011). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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mom’s husband that the drawings were of Beadle’s “tail,” and when she 
touched it, the tail made her hands sticky.8 
Alarmed by what the girl said, the girl’s mother contacted the police.9  A 
detective and a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker interviewed the 
girl.10 It began with a conversational tone, but once the questions turned 
towards Beadle, the girl shut down and became anxious and worried about 
getting in trouble.11 Subsequently, the girl displayed the same emotional 
discomfort and distress when speaking to a therapist and a mental health 
clinician.12 Eventually she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder and a psychiatric condition the court called “sexual abuse of a 
child.”13 
As the case proceeded to trial, the now four-year-old girl was required to 
come into court for a pre-trial hearing.14 On the first day of the hearing, the 
girl crumpled to the floor outside the courtroom and lay there crying, 
refusing to talk for about an hour.15 Even after the social worker got the girl 
to calm down, she still refused to enter the courtroom.16 This behavior 
continued for several days, with the girl screaming and crying in the 
hallway so loud it could be heard in the courtroom.17 The girl never testified 
at the pre-trial hearing, let alone at trial.18 However, her out-of-court 
statements to the detective and the CPS worker were admitted into 
                                                                                                                              
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.at 867. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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evidence.19 At the conclusion of the criminal trial, Beadle was convicted of 
two counts of first-degree child molestation and given an exceptional 
sentence—a sentence above the standard range given the defendant’s 
criminal history and the nature of the crime.20 
The Beadle case exemplifies a traumatic situation for a child victim. 
Despite the good intentions of the parents, the State, the defense, and the 
judiciary, the girl endured a substantial amount of trauma just trying to face 
Beadle in court. Why did the little girl have to endure this emotional 
turmoil?  
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution gives a 
defendant the opportunity to face his or her accuser.21 However, the courts 
have carved out exceptions to this rule to accommodate for extraordinary 
situations like in Beadle. In Crawford v. Washington, decided seven years 
before Beadle, the United States Supreme Court changed the way it 
evaluated Confrontation Clause cases,22 stating courts must analyze whether 
the out-of-court statements that are sought to be admitted against the 
defendant are of a testimonial nature.23 The Crawford court determined that 
if a statement is testimonial, it would be excluded; yet the court declined to 
define the term “testimonial.”24 The Crawford holding drew an ambiguous 
and seemingly malleable line as to when statements are admissible, causing 
much confusion and uncertainty in trial and appellate courts.25 
Like many states, Washington has grappled with the application of 
Crawford and its progeny. Currently, the Washington Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                              
 
19 Id. at 867–68. 
20 Id. at 868. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
22 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal 
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2419 (Dec. 2005). 
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applies a four-factor test to determine whether out-of-court statements are 
testimonial in nature: (1) whether the speaker is describing events 
contemporaneously or instead describing past events; (2) whether a 
reasonable listener would recognize that the speaker is facing an ongoing 
emergency; (3) whether the statements were necessary to resolve a present 
emergency, or instead to learn what had happened in the past; and (4) the 
degree to which the “interrogation” is formal.26 Courts must apply these 
factors uniformly both in terms of structure and substance. At the same 
time, stare decisis requires Confrontation Clause analysis to remain faithful 
to the original Crawford decision and its progeny. 
Washington courts should amend this four-factor test to consider the 
totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether to admit a child 
victim’s out-of-court statement. As part of this totality of the circumstances 
evaluation, this Note offers several additional factors for Washington courts 
to consider, such as the status and role of the listener, the listener’s 
relationship to the child, the behavior of the child during the interaction, the 
substance of the statement, and the environment in which the statement was 
made. 
Part II describes the nature of child sexual abuse cases and how such 
cases are typically prosecuted, which can necessitate special consideration 
when Crawford is applied. Part III outlines the background of United States 
Supreme Court Confrontation Clause analysis, from the reliability test of 
Ohio v. Roberts through the primary purpose test of Michigan v. Bryant.27 
Part IV outlines the relevant framework Washington has chosen in applying 
Crawford. Part V analyzes how Washington appellate courts have applied 
the “testimonial” test of Crawford. Part VI discusses the social justice 
                                                                                                                              
 
26 State v. Pugh, 225 P.3d 892, 896 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (citing Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006)). 
27 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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issues created by Washington’s current regime. And lastly, part VII 
proposes changes in Washington’s application of Crawford to take into 
account the unique cases of child sexual abuse. 
II. NATURE AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
Sexual abuse of children is a silent epidemic in the United States. The 
Department of Child Services recorded more than 63,000 instances of child 
sexual abuse in 2010 alone.28 However, this figure represents only reported 
cases,29 and experts estimate that only 10 percent of sexually abused 
children report to law enforcement and other government agencies.30 Child 
victims can be extremely hesitant to report for a number of reasons. First, 
many cases involve abusers who the children know and trust, such as 
neighbors, family members, and friends of their parents.31 Second, children 
are hesitant because they have feelings of embarrassment or shame about 
the abuse.32 Third, studies have shown that children usually do not 
experience symptoms of child abuse until later in life.33 Other contributing 
factors include the trauma created by the abuser’s grooming process and a 
child’s inability to describe or recognize that the abuse is wrong.34 
Therefore, if children choose to tell someone, it may be months or even 
years after the abuse occurred.35 The prosecution of these cases frequently 
                                                                                                                              
 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 50 (2010), 
available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf. 
29 Id. 
30 Matt Ledesma, Child Sex Abuse Often Unreported: Fewer than 10% of Victims Tell 
Others of Incident, TIMES RECORD NEWS (Nov. 11, 2011 1:00AM), 
http://www.timesrecordnews.com/news/2011/nov/11/child-sex-abuse-often-unreported/. 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Child Sexual Abuse, available at http://www.ptsd. 
va.gov/public/types/violence/child-sexual-abuse.asp. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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hangs on the sole testimony of the victim. Of the children who do testify, it 
can be a difficult process for those who are the most emotionally fragile 
because of the presence of his or her abuser in court. 
Common law previously set high age thresholds for child witnesses, 
usually excluding those under the age of 12 from testifying.36 When the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, however, they “firmly 
rejected arbitrary age barriers, and instead presumed all witnesses were 
competent.”37 By the early 1980s, child physical and sexual abuse cases 
became more prominent in the judicial system due to changes in reporting 
requirements mandated by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
(CAPTA).38 Child testimony was, and is, critical in these cases.39 
There are two major, and often conflicting, societal interests in 
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.40 The first is to limit the amount of 
trauma the child victim suffers during the process of prosecution;41 the 
second is to maximize the amount of lawfully available evidence.42 Studies 
have estimated that children comprise approximately 71 percent of all 
reported sex crime victims.43 A 2008 study found that one in five girls ages 
                                                                                                                              
 
36 Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay: From 
Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1032–34 (2007) (noting several  
presumptions against child competency for certain ages). 
37 Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why 
Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 
239, 240 (2010) (suggesting that this became the model for later state evidence rules, but 
did not eliminate pervasive hostility to presuming young children to be competent). 
38 Id. at 240–41. 
39 Id. at 240. 
40 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 547 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1989) (analyzing 
“conflicting considerations regarding hearsay admissibility in child sexual abuse cases”). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Characteristics of Crimes Against Juveniles, 
JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prevention, Rockville, Md.), June 2000, at 1, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/179034.pdf. 
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14 to 17 had been victims of sexual assault or attempted sexual assault, that 
six percent of all surveyed children were victims in the last year, and that 
nearly ten percent of all the children surveyed had been victims at some 
point.44 A 2006 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) study 
identified almost 80,000 child victims of sexual abuse during child services 
investigations.45 Even these estimates are grossly understated in light of the 
large number of unreported cases.46 
A. Prosecution Difficulty of Child Sexual Abuse Cases 
Child sexual abuse cases are difficult to prosecute for several reasons, 
including that they often lack physical evidence, there are often no third 
party eyewitnesses to the crime, and, in extreme circumstances, the child 
victims may be unavailable to testify.47 Determination of whether to allow 
or prohibit victim testimony in child sexual abuse cases requires a balancing 
of the government, defense, and victim interests.48 The difficulty in 
obtaining evidence, some of which is of questionable reliability, must be 
balanced against the accused’s rights. Additionally, jurors and judges often 
                                                                                                                              
 
44 David Finkelhor et al., Children’s Exposure to Violence: A Comprehensive National 
Survey, JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/ Office of Juvenile Justice & 
Delinquency Prevention, Rockville, Md.), Oct. 2009. at 1-2, 5 available at http://www.nc 
jrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227744.pdf. 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, 26–27 
(2008), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/cm06.pdf. 
46 Tiffany Sharples, Study: Most Child Abuse Goes Unreported, TIME (Dec. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1863650,00.html. 
47 See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact 
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 374–76 (2005) 
(identifying difficulties of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases based on the nature of the 
crime). 
48 Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need 
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
at 214–18 (1995) (discussing conflicting issues of need for hearsay in sexual abuse cases 
and the possible infringements to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). 
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express concern regarding “suggestibility, manipulation, coaching, or 
confusing fact with fantasy,”49 leading them to view child testimony with a 
more skeptical eye than adult testimony.50 
These stereotypes are largely a result of a series of preschool sexual 
abuse scandals during the mid-1980s to the 1990s.51 In the McMartin 
Preschool scandal, one in this series, caretakers of a preschool day care 
facility were charged with multiple counts of child sexual abuse.52 After six 
years of prosecution, there were no convictions.53 As a result, popular 
public opinion reasoned the accusers’ claims must be fictitious, creating a 
general skepticism about these types of cases.54 Also helping create this 
general perception, the suggestive interview techniques, such as positive 
social reinforcement (i.e. praise, approval) and negative feedback (i.e. 
disapproval),55 used in those cases resulted in several “high profile 
                                                                                                                              
 
49 “Unfortunately, there are countless ways that can potentially compromise testimony of 
young children including: the use of yes [or] no questions, forced choice questions, 
repetitious questioning, misleading questions, repeated interviewing plausible 
suggestions, guided imagery, stereotyping, interpreting play with anatomical dolls, peer 
and parental pressure, and selective reinforcement.” Raeder, supra note 38, at 240 (citing 
to Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, Jeopardy in the 
Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children’s Testimony (1995); Nancy E. Walker, 
Forensic Interviews of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity and Legal 
Admissibility, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (Winter 2002) at 149, 160–65). 
50 Raeder, supra note 37, at 375. 
51 See, e.g., Anna Richey-Allen, Note, Presuming Innocence: Expanding the 
Confrontation Clause Analysis to Protect Children and Defendants in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1090, 1104–07 (2009). These scandals involved 
investigations that quickly devolved to “witch hunts.” Id. 
52 Robert Reinhold, The Longest Trial – A Post-Mortem; Collapse of Child-Abuse Case: 
So Much Agony for So Little, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1990, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/1990/01/24/us/longest-trial-post-mortem-collapse-child-abuse-case-so-much-
agony-for-so-little.html. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely Incriminate 
Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007). 
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acquittals, as well as questionable convictions.”56 This distrust of child 
testimony still exists in the minds of jurors, attorneys, and judges.57  
  Additionally, when child victims do take the stand, their behavior can be 
negatively perceived by jurors. Child victims often disclose in stages, the 
child disclosing different parts of an assault over time and possibly out of 
chronological order, which amplifies the risk of perceived inconsistency 
and heightened scrutiny.58 In fact, defense counsel frequently attacks partial 
disclosures as inconsistencies in the victim’s story.59 Similar to domestic 
violence cases,60 another problematic aspect of child victim testimony is a 
high probability of recantation.61  
                                                                                                                              
 
56 Raeder, supra note 37, at 242. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the 
United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 539-40 (2005) 
(discussing the child care sexual abuse cases). 
57 See generally Livia L. Gilstrap et al., Child Witnesses: Common Ground and 
Controversies in the Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59 (2005); 
Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses: Implication of Contemporary Suggestibility 
Research in a Changing Legal Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 99 (2006); 
Stephen J. Ceci et al., Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy, 
3 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311 (2007). 
58 Raeder, supra note 37, at 375. 
59 See Thomas D. Lyon, FALSE DENIALS: OVERCOMING METHODOLOGICAL BIASES IN 
ABUSE DISCLOSURE RESEARCH, IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY AND 
DENIAL 41, 53–54 (Margart-Ellen Pipe et al. eds. 2007); Olafson & Lederson, infra note 
62 at 27, 30. 
60 Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005) 
(“[v]ictims of domestic violence are more prone than other crime victims to recant or 
refuse to cooperate after initially providing information to the police. Recent evidence 
suggests that 80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some point.”). See also 
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions 
to Admit Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 
11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (describing non-cooperation by recantation and 
failure to appear as “an epidemic in domestic violence cases”); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, 
Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence & Justice for Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM, 359, 367–68 (1996) (“[V]ictims of domestic 
violence are uncooperative in approximately eighty to ninety percent of cases.[T]he 
victim will usually recant her prior statements.”). Most of the estimates regarding 
recanting appear anecdotal, since there is no known study measuring victim recanting. 
 
1094      SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
However, there have been no studies to show that all children are 
particularly unreliable witnesses; in fact, children generally understand what 
it means to tell the truth, and do so.62 Studies alleging suggestibility, 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s, usually employed methodological 
biases, whereas recent studies have eliminated these biases and generally 
found that children are not hyper-suggestible.63  
Additionally, studies have compared the disclosures of childhood sexual 
abuse made by adults and children, and found many similar behaviors and 
rates of recantation.64A 2007 study of approximately 250 substantiated 
cases of sexual abuse found that nearly one in four children recanted at 
some point.65 In comparison, some studies have found that up to 71 percent 
of adult rape victims recant.66 When parental figures were the abusers, as is 
commonly the case in child sexual abuse cases,67 children were more likely 
to recant.68 However, the study found no evidence linking recantation to 
false complaints.69 Therefore, even in cases where victims did recant, the 
                                                                                                                              
Certainly, some domestic violence victims are eager to assist in the prosecution of their 
batterers. See id. There is, however, a consensus in the literature that recanting is a 
significant problem in domestic violence cases. See id. 
61 Raeder, supra note 37, at 250. 
62 See, e.g., Erna Olafson & Cindy S. Lederman, The State of the Debate About 
Children’s Disclosure Patterns in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. (Winter 
2006) at 27, 29 (summarizing literature regarding most adults not disclosing child sexual 
abuse as children). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse 
Allegations, 46 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162, 164-65 (2007). 
66 Holly Hogan, The False Dichotomy of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 529, 537 (2006). 
67 Jeffrey S. Turner, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS THE LIFESPAN, 92 
(1996). Although incest is difficult to assess because it mostly occurs in the privacy of the 
abuser’s home, it is estimated that as many as 20 million Americans have been victims of 
incest, which is about one in ten persons. Id. In addition, research has also shown that 
incestuous families are found in every socioeconomic and educational group. Id. 
68 See Malloy et al., supra note 65 at 165. 
69 Id. at 166. 
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researchers found nothing to indicate that the initial allegations were false.70 
Ultimately, adults are just as capable of lying as children,71 but children are 
subject to higher levels of scrutiny given the perceived credibility issues.72 
B. Multidisciplinary Approach to Addressing Child Sexual Abuse 
Child Advocacy Centers were created to deal with child distress and fear 
of the court system, and to coordinate the disjointed efforts of social 
services and the criminal justice system.73 These centers recognize, prevent, 
and support child abuse victims by creating a single location for children to 
get a variety of services.74 Many states have adopted the multidisciplinary 
team approach to investigating and remedying child sexual abuse.75 
Multidisciplinary teams provide “a well-coordinated response to child abuse 
allegations in a collaborative manner amongst the various team members, 
which generally include social workers, prosecutors, police officers, or 
mental and medical health professionals.”76 These teams are better prepared 
to “discern the truthfulness of allegation, lessen the trauma of repeated 
                                                                                                                              
 
70 Id. 
71 NEW ZEALAND LAW COMM’N, THE EVIDENCE OF CHILDREN AND OTHER 
VULNERABLE WITNESSES: A DISCUSSION PAPER 8 (October 1996). 
72 Raeder, supra note 37, at 252. 
73 NAT’L CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CTR., History, http://www.nationalcac.org/history/ 
history.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). See generally Theodore P. Cross et al., 
Evaluating Children’s Advocacy Centers’ Response to Child Sexual Abuse, JUV. JUST. 
BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice/Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, 
Rockville, Md.), Aug. 2008, at 1–2, available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/ 
218530.pdf. 
74 Id. 
75 See generally Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child 
Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. 
REV. 167–69 (2009) (advocating for child statements made during forensic interviews 
with the multidisciplinary teams to be admitted into evidence). 
76 Laura E. Ruzzo, The Testimonial Nature of Multidisciplinary Team Interviews in 
Massachusetts: Applying Crawford to the Child Declarant, 16 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 227, 229 (2011). 
1096      SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
interviewing, and provide mental health services to traumatized children.”77 
Congress showed approval of this approach through the Victims of Child 
Abuse Act (VCAA), which encouraged use of multidisciplinary teams to 
train judges, attorneys, court officers, and others involved in the prosecution 
of child sexual abuse cases.78 
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
ANALYSIS 
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against 
him.”79 The provision, also known as the Confrontation Clause, provides 
criminal defendants with the right to cross-examine an adverse witness, who 
must testify under penalty of perjury.80 Thus, out of court statements are 
generally inadmissible hearsay. 
A. Ohio v. Roberts 
From 1980 to 2004, courts used the Roberts standard of reliability test to 
determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements.81 In Roberts, the 
Court noted that since the Confrontation Clause prefers “face-to-face 
confrontation at trial,” the primary interest of the defendant is the right to 
cross-examination.82 However, the Court determined that this right is not 
absolute; it only limits the scope of admissible hearsay evidence rather than 
setting a complete bar.83 So the Court established a new rule for 
                                                                                                                              
 
77 See generally Cross et al., supra note 73. 
78 See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(g)(2)(G) (2006). 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
80 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring in-court testimony of adverse 
witnesses ensures sworn statements). 
81 See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
82 Id. at 63. 
83 Id. at 64. 
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determining admissibility of hearsay evidence: the Roberts test. The 
Roberts test requires courts to look at (1) whether the declarant was 
available to testify and (2) whether the statement provided adequate “indicia 
of reliability” to be trustworthy.84 Indicia of reliability meant that the 
evidence either fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
demonstrates “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”85 
For 24 years, the Roberts standard was used in courts across the nation. 
However, the Crawford decision in 2004 significantly changed the 
framework for hearsay admissibility. Starting with Crawford, the United 
States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that shifted the focus of 
the hearsay admissibility test from reliability to the statement’s 
“testimonial” nature.86 
B. Crawford v. Washington 
With Justice Scalia writing for the seven-justice majority, the Crawford 
Court overruled Roberts, claiming that the Roberts terms and factors were 
too ambiguous.87 After analyzing the history of the Confrontation Clause, 
Justice Scalia determined that, first, the Clause was directed at “the use of 
ex parte examinations as evidence” in criminal prosecutions against the 
accused, and second, the Framers were specifically worried about 
testimonial statements of unavailable witnesses that the defendant did not 
                                                                                                                              
 
84 Id. at 66. 
85 Id. 
86 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 
(2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
87 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (stating that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely 
subjective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is 
reliable; the nine-factor balancing test applied by the Court of Appeals below is 
representative”). Scalia went on further to state that “[w]hether a statement is deemed 
reliable depends heavily in which factors the judge consider and how much weight he 
accords each of them,” and that the test was “so unpredictable that it fails to provide 
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.” Id. 
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have a chance to cross-examine.88 Therefore, Scalia reasoned, the Framers 
did not intend to focus on the reliability of the statements, but rather the 
testimonial quality of statements.89 
Although the Court declined to give a precise test defining what is or is 
not “testimonial,” it did provide three examples of potentially testimonial 
evidence.90 First, testimonial evidence may be “ex parte in-court testimony 
or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorily.”91 Second, testimonial statements could 
include “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confession.”92 
Third, the evidence could be “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” also known as 
the objective witness test.93 The Court suggested that a “common nucleus” 
existed among the three examples but declined to explain this concept 
further.94 The Court also failed to define “interrogation” for purposes of this 
inquiry, stating only that the term be understood in its “colloquial, rather 
than any technical legal, sense.”95 
Despite the majority’s intent to provide a clear formula for Confrontation 
Clause analysis, the Crawford test has been subject to much criticism—
namely, that it causes “additional confusion, continued judicial activism, 
                                                                                                                              
 
88 Id. at 50, 53–54. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 51–52. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 52. 
95 Id. at 53 n.4. 
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and further opportunity for interjurisdictional conflict.”96 Without guiding 
principles for distinguishing testimonial statements from non-testimonial 
statements, the Supreme Court failed to fully correct the structural errors it 
saw in Roberts.97 This failure has resulted in confusion and inconsistent 
judgments in lower courts across the nation.98 By leaving the definition of 
testimonial “for another day,”99 a day which has yet to come, the Court 
failed to address a significant gap in Confrontation Clause analysis. The 
Court even acknowledged in a footnote “that our refusal to articulate a 
comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty.”100 
This interim period has now lasted a decade, and there has been no rule 
repairing the inadequacies of the Crawford test. 
C. Evolving Crawford Doctrine 
Two years after the decision in Crawford, in the consolidated cases of 
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, the Court addressed the 
issues of whether victims’ statements to a 911 operator or in a domestic 
violence affidavit were testimonial.101 However, with Justice Scalia again 
writing for the majority opinion, the Davis court also failed to clearly define 
what makes a statement testimonial. The Court agreed with Crawford’s 
assertion that “‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 
                                                                                                                              
 
96 E.g. Andrew W. Eichner, Preserving Innocence: Protecting Child Victims in the Post-
Crawford Legal System 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 101, 104 (2010). 
97 Id.; Stephanie McMahon, Note, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v. Washington: 
Where for Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361, 365 
(2006). 
98 See generally Robert O. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to 
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 921 (2007) 
(analyzing similar results but different reasoning in lower court decisions). 
99 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
100 Id. at 68 n.10. 
101 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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interrogations,’” are typically testimonial.102 However, the Court also 
recognized that in Crawford, it failed to define “interrogation” for purposes 
of this inquiry, stating only that the term be understood in its “colloquial, 
rather than any technical legal, sense.”103 Forced to more precisely 
determine what types of statements in police interrogations are considered 
testimonial, the Court found that when police questioning takes place during 
an emergency situation, witness statements might be considered non-
testimonial.104 Specifically, if the objective primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to address an ongoing 
emergency, rather than establish or prove past events relevant to future 
prosecution, then the statements are non-testimonial.105  
The Court laid out factors to determine if an emergency is present: 
whether a reasonable person in the listener’s position would understand that 
the declarant’s statements were a call for help during a genuine emergency, 
whether the statements were necessary to allow law enforcement to respond 
to the existing emergency, and the degree of formality of the questioning.106  
  Although the Davis opinion attempted to clarify issues left unresolved by 
Crawford, it ultimately “attenuated the force of its holding by drawing an 
extremely hazy line between what is considered testimonial versus non-
testimonial interrogation . . . while simultaneously failing to offer clear 
guidance” to determine when a statement shifts from one category to the 
next.107 
                                                                                                                              
 
102 Id. at 822. 
103 Id. at 53 n.4. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–27. 
107 Eichner, supra note 96, at 107. 
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Three years later, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court revisited the ongoing 
emergency test it had set forward in Davis.108 The Court declared that Davis 
was intended to apply only in important situations bearing on the 
Confrontation Clause, not necessarily in every case. Specifically, the Court 
focused on out-of-court statements where government actors formally 
interrogate a declarant to obtain evidence for future prosecution.109 In 
Bryant, the Court also enumerated considerations to objectively analyze the 
primary purpose test.110 First, lower courts should look at “the 
circumstances of an encounter” as well as “the statements and actions of the 
parties.”111 Second, courts should deduce the reasonably objective purpose 
that these actions and statements imply.112 Curiously, the Court added that 
the primary purpose test involves consideration of hearsay rules in 
determining reliability of the statement.113  
Ultimately, the Crawford line of cases fail to comprehensively define 
“testimonial,” which has led to confusion throughout the courts and created 
the existing problem in relevant Washington case law. 
IV. WASHINGTON FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING CRAWFORD 
Washington courts have grappled with the ambiguity resulting from 
Crawford and its progeny. In child sexual abuse cases, local appellate courts 
have not reached a consensus on the Crawford admissibility of victims’ out-
of-court statements.114 However, the Crawford decision has severely 
                                                                                                                              
 
108 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). 
109 Id. at 1155. 
110 Id. at 1156. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1155. 
114 These cases span from 2004, when Crawford was decided to 2012, when this article 
was written. The Washington State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
determined that Crawford is not retroactive. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); 
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limited, if not entirely banned, the admission of child hearsay statements 
elicited during forensic interviews and other child sexual abuse out-of-court 
statements.115 These types of cases face the greatest challenges116 under 
Crawford because difficult child sexual abuse cases often lack physical 
evidence or eyewitness testimony. These cases often involve a child-
declarant who is not available for cross-examination and does not appear in 
court.117 Such cases are even further complicated by Crawford issues 
because of the type of proceeding addressing the abuse, such as civil 
commitment hearings where defendants do not have Confrontation Clause 
rights.118 Initially, Washington courts analyzed the state of mind of the 
declarant to determine the testimonial nature of the statement.119 This was 
based on language from Crawford which claimed that statements were 
                                                                                                                              
In re Markel, 111 P.3d 249 (Wash. 2005). However, the Ninth Circuit observed the 
retroactivity of Crawford until the Whorton ruling. Bockting v. Bayer, 66 F.3d 1010 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
115 See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 37, at 375. 
116 Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, Crawford and Child Abuse, Domestic 
Violence, and Elder Abuse Cases, 6 No. 5 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE 3 (Sep/Oct 2005). 
117 A child’s inability to remember facts while testifying does not implicate Crawford 
because the child is still available for cross-examination. State v. Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 
1192 (Wash. 2006); State v. Robinson, 166 Wash. App. 1013 (2012); State v. Yackley, 
127 Wash. App. 1017 (2005); State v. Price, 110 P.3d 1171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); State 
v. Lobos, 165 Wash. App. 1002 (2011). The child is also available for cross-examination 
if he or she forgets the events of the crime or past disclosures while testifying. State v. 
Dodgen, 198 P.3d 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Closed circuit television testimony by the 
child-declarant is sufficiently “available for cross examination” under Crawford. State v. 
M.G.H., 162 Wash. App. 1020 (2011). 
118 Crawford does not apply retroactively, because “[c]riminal defendant[s] who were 
denied Crawford’s procedural requirements by reason of timing were not dispossessed of 
all meaningful opportunity to challenge the admission of the testimony.” In re Markel, 
111 P.3d 249 (Wash. 2005). There are no Sixth Amendment Crawford rights in a 
sexually violent predator (SVP) civil commitment hearing. In re Detention of Allen, 174 
P.3d 103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). There are also no Sixth Amendment Crawford rights in 
a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SOSSA) revocation hearing. State v. 
Marshall, 133 Wash. App. 1021 (2006). 
119 E.g. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
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testimonial if the declarant “would reasonably expect [his or her statement] 
to be used prosecutorily,” (the objective witness test.)120  
The Washington State Supreme Court held in Shafer and Beadle that the 
admissibility of all out-of-court statements is determined by a four-factor 
test: (1) timing of statement relative to the event, (2) threat of harm, (3) 
need of information to resolve a present emergency, and (4) formality of 
interrogation. Although the four factors were not exhaustive and these 
opinions instructed lower courts to look to other factors,121 typically courts, 
including the Washington State Supreme Court, focus solely on these 
factors when making determinations of admissibility.122 
In Shafer, the morning after the child’s aunt had babysat her, the child 
told her mother that her uncle had “touched [her] privates.”123 The court 
ultimately held that the child victim’s statements to her mother, and to a 
family friend a week later, were non-testimonial.124 This finding was made 
despite the fact that the statement to the family friend was made after the 
child and her mother had visited the hospital, and the crime had been 
reported to the authorities.125 The court also considered the constitutionality 
issue of the child hearsay statute, RCW 9A.44.120, and if it conflicted with 
Washington State’s Constitution article I, section 22 Confrontation 
Clause.126 On that issue, the court determined that the statute had already 
                                                                                                                              
 
120 Id. (laying out the objective witness test). 
121 State v. Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273, 1282–83 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
122 See State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011) (where the court did not look to 
factors outside of the Ohlson four-factor test); see State v. Reed, 278 P.3d 203, 210 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“[o]ur inquiry is guided by [only] four factors”). 
123 Shafer, 128 P.3d at 89. 
124 Id. at 93. 
125 Id. at 89. 
126 Id. 
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been deemed constitutional in a previous case.127 Rejecting the objective 
witness test, the Shafer court found that the three-year-old victim could not 
have possibly expected her statements would be used as evidence at trial.128 
In Beadle (the facts having been laid out in Part I), the court applied only 
the four factors enumerated in Ohlson.129 Ultimately, the court held that the 
child’s statements to her mother, her mother’s live-in boyfriend, her 
mother’s husband, and her therapist were non-testimonial, while statements 
to a detective and a Child Protective Services official were testimonial.130 
However, the court stated, “[a]lthough Jensen [the CPS Worker] was not a 
law enforcement officer, she was present only to assist the police 
departmentnot to protect [the child’s] welfare in her capacity as a CPS 
employee.”131 The court implied that had the CPS official not been 
questioning the child in assistance of the detective, those statements made 
to the official may have been non-testimonial. 
                                                                                                                              
 
127 Id.; State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (1984). 
RCW 9A.44.120 comport[s] with the general approach utilized to 
test hearsay against confrontation guarantees. The statute requires a 
preliminary determination ‘that the time, content, and circumstances 
of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.’ It requires 
the child to testify at the proceedings, or to be unavailable, and does 
not alter the necessary showing of unavailability. Neither 
unavailability nor reliability was shown prior to admitting the 
hearsay testimony. 
Id. 
128 Id. 
129 State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 870. 
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V. WASHINGTON’S APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD 
A. Statements to Police Officers and Prosecutors 
In Washington, statements to police officers and prosecutors are 
generally considered testimonial, but there are some exceptions.132 
Washington recognizes the ongoing emergency exception133 as well as an 
exception when police involvement is more informal.134 The ongoing 
emergency exception is a public policy consideration that such statements 
are necessary, but the current Washington analysis of statements to police 
officers and prosecutors critically limits the use of this doctrine in child 
sexual abuse cases. 
1. Ongoing Emergency as Applied to Police and Prosecution 
Generally, the ongoing emergency exception in Washington requires that 
certain factors be met. In State v. Koslowski, which involved a robbery, the 
Washington Supreme Court set out several factors to distinguish between 
police officers serving in an emergency capacity and police officers serving 
in an investigatory capacity: (1) whether events discussed were occurring at 
the time of the statement or shortly thereafter, (2) whether a reasonable 
listener would believe there was an ongoing emergency, (3) whether the 
purpose of the conversation objectively indicated, and (4) whether the 
interrogation was formal.135 Although Crawford generally sought to exclude 
statements made to police officers, there has been no per se bar to admitting 
these statements. 
                                                                                                                              
 
132 See, e.g., id. See also State v. Price, 110 P.3d 1171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 146 
P.3d 1183 (2006) (holding that a child victim’s statements to a detective were 
testimonial, but holding that the defendant had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine 
at trial to satisfy Crawford). 
133 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-27 (2006). 
134 See Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273 (Wash. 2007). 
135 State v. Koslowski, 209 P.3d 479, 484 (Wash. 2009). 
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There are also situations where police response is deemed an ongoing 
emergency because of the proximity in time between the alleged crime and 
the officer’s response. For instance, in State v. Ohlson, statements made by 
a minor to a law enforcement officer during the investigation of an assault 
were considered non-testimonial.136 In that case, the defendant tried to run 
over two juveniles on the side of the road.137 When the officer arrived on 
the scene minutes later, one of the minors told him what happened and how 
she had to jump out of the way.138 The court found that the purpose of the 
questioning was part of the ongoing emergency because the officer was on 
the scene within minutes of the alleged assault.139 
However, these factors do not consider the special nature of these types 
of cases. First, police officers and prosecutors are key members of many 
multidisciplinary teams. As previously stated, incest and child sexual abuse 
cases frequently require the intervention from law enforcement and 
subsequent prosecution in order to end the cycle of violence. Many experts 
in the field of child sexual abuse cases would quickly and easily categorize 
these types of situations as ongoing emergencies, especially when the 
abuser lives in the same home as the victim.140 However, the courts have yet 
to recognize this type of situation as an ongoing emergency because the 
child is not actively being assaulted when law enforcement intervenes. 
Police officers and prosecutors wield the ability to remove these abusers 
from the home, allowing the victim to escape ongoing abuse.141 
                                                                                                                              
 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1275. 
138 Id. 
139 Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273. 
140 See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of 
Female Children after Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251 (2001). 
141 Abusive Relationships, PLEA.ORG, http://www.plea.org/legal_resources/?a=231& 
searchTxt (last update Nov. 4, 2013). 
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Additionally, the four factors announced in Koslowski ignore the nature 
of child sexual abuse and isolate these cases from other crimes. The first 
factor ignores the fact that it is rare for a child to immediately report abuse 
as it happens or even minutes later.142 The second factor (whether a 
reasonable listener would believe that there was an ongoing emergency) is 
equally disserving because detecting child sexual abuse requires special 
expertise and training that a reasonable listener may not have. The third 
factor ignores the fact that child interview specialists, who are sometimes 
also law enforcement, interview the child for the purpose of prosecuting the 
abuser.143 Lastly, while the nature of child questioning by law enforcement 
and prosecution requires the questioning to be simplified, bringing a child 
to a prosecutor’s office and asking them about every detail of the abuse will 
likely be interpreted as formal interrogation. Therefore, these factors are not 
helpful in child sexual abuse cases because a large number of these cases 
are excluded just based on their nature as child victim cases. 
2. Police and Prosecution in Informal Contexts 
Distinguishing between casual and formal police interactions is what 
Crawford intends to do and, theoretically, such an analysis will produce 
good results. However, the applied factors fail to recognize this difference. 
First, Crawford and its progeny exclude information based on how closely 
the statement resembles in-court testimony. This requires a case-by-case 
analysis. However, as explained above, the four-factor test used in 
Washington generally does not favor admission of statements made to law 
enforcement. Therefore, it seems like most cases involving informal 
                                                                                                                              
 
142 See, e.g., id. 
143 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SRVS., 
Techniques for the Child Interview and a Methodology for Substantiating Sexual Abuse,  
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/sexabuse/sexabusee.cfm (last visited 
April 7, 2013). 
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statements to police could still be inadmissible based on the nature of child 
sexual abuse and the investigation. Second, the Davis court expressed the 
importance of admissibility of statements to resolve an ongoing 
emergency,144 yet Washington courts use factors that narrowly identify 
“ongoing” as singular events.145 Because by the time a child reports he or 
she is not actively being abused, child sexual abuse is not considered an 
ongoing emergency. 
3. Police in 911 Calls 
When the call is for emergency help, 911 calls are sometimes considered 
non-testimonial.146 However, children who experience sexual abuse rarely 
call 911.147 A 911 call about child sexual abuse is more likely to be the 
result of the child victim telling a confidant who then reports it to law 
enforcement. In such a case, hearsay is an issue. Therefore, any hope for 
admission of statements by abused children, through a 911 exception, is 
highly unlikely. Overall, most out-of-court statements to police or 
prosecutors will generally be excluded as violations of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
B. Statements to Child Welfare and Social Workers 
Statements to social workers are usually classified as testimonial because 
they are government employees who record and report incriminating 
information to law enforcement, which are used primarily for 
                                                                                                                              
 
144 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
145 See State v. Koslowski, 209 P.3d 479, 484 (Wash. 2009). 
146 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005); State v. Pugh, 225 P.3d 892 (Wash. 2009); 
State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
147 THE CHILDREN’S ASSESSMENT CTR., Child Sexual Abuse Facts, 
http://cachouston.org/child-sexual-abuse-facts/ (last visited April 7, 2013). 
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prosecution.148 However, courts have sometimes recognized that the 
primary purpose of a social worker interview is “not only to collect 
evidence of past events to secure the prosecution of an offender but to 
protect prospectively a child in need.”149 
In Beadle, a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker, while accompanied 
by a police officer, interviewed a three-year-old victim.150 Based on Shafer, 
the Court of Appeals found the statements were non-testimonial where a 
three-year old child victim was found unable to have possibly expected her 
statements to be used in a criminal prosecution.151 However, the 
Washington State Supreme Court rejected this concept—that the primary 
purpose test should be declarant-centric when police interrogation is 
involved, and decided instead to look at the officer’s state of mind.152 The 
court ultimately determined that the police officer’s presence tainted the 
admissibility of those statements and that the CPS worker was “only present 
to assist the police department, not to protect the [child’s] welfare,” in [the 
CPS worker’s] professional capacity.153 
Although the Washington Supreme Court was unwilling to consider child 
welfare as a primary purpose in these investigations, in State v. Hopkins, 
Division 2 of the Washington State Court of Appeals did exactly that.154 In 
that case, a CPS worker met with the child victim on two occasions.155 The 
court found the purpose of the first meeting was a safety check to assess and 
                                                                                                                              
 
148 Stephanie McMahon, The Turbulent Aftermath of Crawford v. Washington: Where Do 
Child Abuse Victims’ Statements Stand?, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 361, 382 (2006). 
149 State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 788–89 (N.J. 2008). 
150 State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863 (Wash. 2011). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 870. 
154 State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
155 Id. at 257. 
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ensure the child was safe and secure where she was living.156 The court 
reasoned that the worker used innocuous, non-leading questions and the 
child spontaneously reported information about her abuser.157 
However, the court stated that, although the second meeting could be 
characterized as an attempt to protect the child, the information gathered 
was also meant for subsequent prosecution.158 The social worker testified 
that her role in the second meeting was to investigate; she recorded 
information gained in the interview and asked questions based on the 
disclosures.159 She also testified that the explicit purpose of documenting 
the visit was because the victim was disclosing information about a 
crime.160 
Ultimately, the court believed that the CPS worker’s child welfare role 
overlapped with her investigatory law enforcement role, thus her role 
produced incriminating statements elicited outside the course of an ongoing 
emergency.161 The court focused its analysis on the primary purpose of the 
investigation from the listener’s point of view.162 By recognizing the dual-
purpose of social workers in such cases, the court balanced the 
constitutional rights of the defendant against those interests of the victim 
and the search for justice. This balance is particularly just because it 
recognizes the multifaceted role of the CPS worker, or anyone acting as a 
confidant of a child who has been the victim of sexual abuse. The 
investigatory role of CPS workers protects the defendant’s rights, while the 
welfare role reflects the victim’s interests. 
                                                                                                                              
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 258. 
162 See id. 256–58. 
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Unfortunately, the holding in Beadle supersedes Hopkins. Despite the 
judicial system’s general adversity to looking into the mind of police 
officers,163 and despite the Davis court requiring a declarant-centric primary 
purpose,164 the Beadle court reasoned that, as long as a CPS worker is aware 
of an ongoing criminal investigation, the primary purpose of his or her 
questioning is for subsequent prosecution.165 This holding forecloses the 
possibility of CPS conducting investigations in many child sexual abuse 
cases where law enforcement or government action is necessary to remove 
the child from danger because courts will characterize CPS action as 
criminal investigation. 
C. Statements to Medical Personnel and Other Hospital Employees 
Statements made by children to medical personnel are typically perceived 
as non-testimonial166 because the purpose of the conversation is to ascertain 
the child’s medical history, to diagnose, and to treat.167 In State v. Borboa, 
the child victim was brought to a hospital where she disclosed sexual abuse 
by her father.168 Because neither the child nor the family spoke English, a 
                                                                                                                              
 
163 See, e.g., Holyfield v. State, 711 P.2d 834, 838 n.4 (Nev. 1985). 
164 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
165 See State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 870 (2011). 
166 See generally Dave Gordon, Is There an Accuser in the House?: Evaluating 
Statements Made to Physicians and Other Medical Personnel in the Wake of Crawford v. 
Washington and Davis v. Washington, 38 N.M. L. REV. 529 (2008). 
167 State v. Sandoval, 154 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a domestic 
violence victim’s description of the incident to an emergency room physician was 
admissible, despite inclusion of statements identifying the perpetrator); State v. Saunders, 
132 P.3d 743 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a domestic violence victim’s 
statements to a paramedic and to an emergency room physician were non-testimonial, 
despite the victim’s identification of the assailant); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2005) (victim’s statements to medical personnel in a murder case were found to 
be non-testimonial); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (victim’s 
statements to medical personnel in a case for assault on a child were non-testimonial. 
168 State v. Borboa, 135 P.3d 469, 471 (Wash. 2006). 
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hospital interpreter was present at the physical examination.169 Although the 
Washington Supreme Court did not decide whether the statements were 
testimonial, because the issue was not briefed on appeal and defense 
conceded the issue at oral arguments, it signaled its assent to the lower 
court’s holding.170 A finding that the statements were not testimonial is 
supported by the fact that the hospital interpreter was present to relay 
medically relevant information to the doctors and assist the medical team, 
not to assist law enforcement or other government actors.171 
In State v. Anderson, Division 2 of the Washington Court of Appeals 
addressed whether statements to a nurse during a sexual assault exam were 
testimonial or non-testimonial.172 In that case, the prosecution alleged that 
the defendant had lured a little boy into a public restroom, persuaded him to 
lie down on his back, and then got on top of him to engage in sexual 
conduct.173 Because the State wanted to introduce molestation evidence of a 
different minor who was unavailable to testify, the prosecutor sought to call 
a nurse who had had a conversation with the minor.174 The minor had come 
to the nurse following a forensic interview with a detective who told the 
nurse what the child had already disclosed.175 The court determined that the 
examination was part of a “team approach” to investigations, referring to 
the multidisciplinary teams used frequently in child sexual abuse cases.176 
Additionally, the court concluded, but did not find dispositive, that the 
nurse had received information from a detective to whom the child had 
disclosed information to prior to the exam; thus, her conversation with the 
                                                                                                                              
 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 475, n.3. 
171 Id. at 471. 
172 State v. Anderson, 153 Wash. App. 1026, *1 (2009). 
173 State v. Anderson, 254 P.3d 815, 815 (Wash. 2011). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Anderson, 153 Wash. App. at *2. 
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child could be considered part of the investigation.177 However, the court 
believed that the statements to the nurse were elicited in the course of 
obtaining medical history to treat and diagnose the child, not to investigate 
on the detective’s behalf.178 The factual finding that the nurse never used 
leading questions supported this holding.179 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the ruling because 
the nurse had knowledge that the child had already disclosed information to 
law enforcement.180 The court did not look at whether the child believed the 
statements would later be used for future prosecution.181 This suddenly 
shifted the analysis from looking at the declarant-based primary purpose 
test to a Davis listener-based test. 
The Court of Appeals Division 2 signaled agreement with the State’s 
argument in State v. Earl, but ultimately decided the issue based on 
harmless error.182 In that case, the victims’ abuser was the father, who had 
impregnated one of the child victims.183 While at a prenatal appointment, 
the pregnant child made statements to a nurse who later testified at trial.184 
The court acknowledged that the State’s argument to the appeals court was 
likely correct, that the statements were non-testimonial because they were 
made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, not elicited for 
subsequent prosecution.185 
                                                                                                                              
 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Anderson, 254 P.3d 818 (holding that the statements were admissible anyways under a 
harmless error analysis). 
181 See id. at 817. 
182 State v. Earl, 143 Wash. App. 1004, *6–*7 (2008). 
183 Id. at 1–2. 
184 Id. at 2. 
185 Id. at 6. 
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Lastly, the Division 2 Court in State v. Hopkins addressed the out-of-
court statements made to a nurse,186 but applied a completely different 
standard of analysis.187 Although the nurse’s statements were introduced 
through the nurse’s report in this case, the substantive analysis of the 
primary purpose test should be the same as if the nurse had testified; the 
only difference is the additional level of hearsay presented by the report. 188 
Instead of looking at the primary purpose of the nurse from the declarant’s 
point of view, the court used an objective witness test.189 The court held that 
an objective witness would believe the report would be used for later 
prosecution.190 The court reasoned that the nurse knew there was an 
ongoing investigation and that the nurse manifested this knowledge and 
intent by forwarding the report to a deputy officer.191 
These cases reveal inconsistencies in reasoning and holdings within 
Court of Appeals Division 2 level and at the Supreme Court level. For 
example, although the Washington Supreme Court in Shafer stated that 
objective witness tests should not be used, only six months later, the 
Division 2 Hopkins court proceeded under this objective-witness 
analysis.192 Division 2 subsequently decided multiple cases without 
overruling use of the objective witness test, or overruling the Hopkins 
court’s dismissal of statements to nurses if they are aware of criminal 
investigation. The prior cases are still good law; therefore, there is a lack of 
clarity that will continue to create confusion in the trial courts and appellate 
divisions..  
                                                                                                                              
 
186 State v. Hopkins, 142 P.3d 1104, 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
187 Id. at 790–91. 
188 Id. at 787. 
189 Id. at 790–91. 
190 Id. at 791. 
191 Id. 
192 Id.; State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006). 
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By shifting between objective-witness tests, declarant-centric tests, and 
listener-centric tests, appellate courts have confused the proper inquiry for 
these types of cases. When courts found these statements to be non-
testimonial, it was because they confused the primary purpose with the 
secondary purpose. For example, although the nurse in Hopkins likely 
intended to eventually give the report to law enforcement, her primary 
purpose as a nurse was medical, and any collateral effect on an investigation 
was secondary. Furthermore, through application of the declarant-centric 
test prescribed by Davis, the child would reasonably view the nurse’s 
primary purpose was for her own health and well-being. 
D. Statements to Family Members and Friends 
Courts usually hold statements made to family and close friends as non-
testimonial.193 The circumstances surrounding these statements usually 
reflect the close personal relationship between the child-declarant and the 
listener.194 These are the types of casual statements the original Crawford 
court believed to be non-testimonial because the personal nature of the 
statements shows the unlikelihood they were intended for use in later 
prosecution.195 This is also the standard in Washington cases of child sexual 
abuse.196 
The issue in Shafer revolved around statements made to a family friend 
who had been a confidential informant for several law enforcement 
                                                                                                                              
 
193 See State v. Beadle, 154 Wash. App. 1021, *7 (2010); State v. Borboa, 135 P.3d 469, 
471 (Wash. 2006), Shafer, 128 P.3d 87; State v. Walker, 118 P.3d 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005); State v. Dezee, 125 Wash. App. 1009 (2005), State v. J.J.S.H., 158 Wash. App. 
1050 (2010); State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
194 Id. 
195 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
196 See Beadle, 154 Wash. App. at *7 (2010); Borboa, 135 P.3d at 471; Shafer, 128 P.3d 
87; Walker, 118 P.3d 935; Dezee, 125 Wash. App. 1009; J.J.S.H., 158 Wash. App. 1050; 
Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250. 
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agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.197 The court held that the 
statement was non-testimonial partly based on the close proximity in time 
between the abuse and when the child made the statements to the family 
friend.198 The court refused to conclude the statements were testimonial 
even though it acknowledged the ethical and legal implications of this case; 
simply put, the statements were elicited by a confidential informant using 
learned questioning techniques, with the full intent to use them in a future 
criminal investigation.199 Instead, the court decided that the informant was 
not acting on behalf of any law enforcement agency at the time of the 
questioning and the child had no reason to expect that her statements would 
later be used for prosecution.200 The court was uneasy about statements 
which the informant videotaped, however, and excluded that evidence.201 
This case demonstrates the problems of a mixed-test analysis. Although 
the child may not have realized the testimonial nature of such structured and 
formal questioning, the court cannot disregard that this questioning is very 
similar to police interrogation. Friends of children whose parents are police 
can now circumvent the Confrontation Clause limits on the admissibility of 
out-of-court statements. Although this is good news for child victims and 
the prosecution, this particular case only further complicates what should be 
clear rules. 
E. Statements in Business Records 
Business documents are usually non-testimonial because they are 
prepared for public records or business purposes rather than for evidence in 
                                                                                                                              
 
197 Shafer, 128 P.3d at 89. 
198 Id. at 97–98. 
199 Id. at 92. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
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a criminal case.202 However, one appellate court found an exception in a 
child sexual abuse case and held business documents to be testimonial.203 
One exception was noted when a nurse submitted a report to an 
investigating deputy and the nurse knew there was an ongoing 
investigation.204 
Several cases demonstrate how documents submitted by out-of-court 
declarants are non-testimonial in the context of child sexual abuse cases. In 
State v. Graciano, the Division 2 Court of Appeals found Department of 
Licensing certification was non-testimonial.205 The court did not explain 
much of its reasoning, but rather cited to State v. Mares. The Mares court 
reasoned that business and public records are generally non-testimonial 
because they are created for administration of an entity’s affairs and not for 
                                                                                                                              
 
202 See, e.g., State v. Benefiel, 128 P.3d 1251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
certified copies of the defendant’s underlying conviction and sentence were non-
testimonial). The court claimed that these documents were typical public records and 
were not statements written for the purpose of subsequent prosecution, rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that the State had a duty to prosecute the clerk who certified the 
copies of the judgment and sentence so that the defendant could cross-examine the clerk. 
Id. See also State v. Fleming, 228 P.3d 804 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that business 
records showing the value of a property in a theft case were non-testimonial because the 
records were prepared for business purposes long before the alleged theft took place); 
State v. Bellerouche, 120 P.3d 971 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that business records 
are never testimonial, and that a “no trespass” notice is a business record in a trespassing 
prosecution). 
203 See State v. Hopkins, 134 Wash. App. 1034 (2006) (holding that a report written by a 
nurse concerning the child victim’s statements and physical condition was testimonial 
because the report was prepared at the request of law enforcement and the nurse was not 
available for cross-examination). Business records are usually defined narrowly to 
include only objective, nearly clerical, information and to not always include reports of 
opinion. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.M., 125 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that written expert reports of persons who were not present in court were testimonial 
because they reflected professional judgment and expertise and not the sort of “routine 
clerical notations” that are admissible). 
204 See Hopkins, 134 Wash. App. 1034. 
205 State v. Graciano, 163 Wash. App. 1014, *4 (2011). 
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the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.206 Specifically, the 
business records in both cases only attested to the authenticity of a public 
record and offered no interpretation of the record or assertions of “its 
relevance, substance, or effect.”207 
Similar in character to cases involving business records, State v. Earl 
found that a blood-draw form was non-testimonial.208 The victims in that 
case were two sisters who had been raped by their father.209 A Child 
Protective Services worker asked both children to get blood tests and drove 
them to an appropriate facility with their mother.210 The Division 2 court 
determined that the blood-draw form was a business record.211 The court 
also found the form non-testimonial on the basis that it was not an 
accusatory statement, but rather only stated when the blood draw occurred 
and whose blood it was.212 The court supported this holding by citing the 
corroboration by other evidence and testimony.213 
Similarly, a Division 3 case decided that a letter from the attorney of the 
defendant’s brother to the victim’s mother was non-testimonial.214 In 
Merrick, the mother was a widow and had remarried her late husband’s 
brother, the defendant.215 After the defendant was accused and tried for 
first-degree rape of a child, the prosecution sought to admit the letter 
because it raised concerns about the defendant contacting the victim.216 
Ultimately, the court held that the purpose of the letter was not for later 
                                                                                                                              
 
206 Id.; State v. Mares, 248 P.3d 140, 143 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
207 Id. 
208 State v. Earl, 143 Wash. App. 1004, *3–*4 (2008). 
209 Id. at *1–*2. 
210 Id. at *3. 
211 Id. at *5. 
212 Id. at *6. 
213 Id. 
214 State v. Merrick, 130 Wash. App. 1026, *3–*4 (2005). 
215 Id. at *1. 
216 Id. at *3–*4. 
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prosecution, but to express concerns to the victim’s mother.217 Additionally, 
the letter was not written by a government officer.218 
Only one child sexual abuse case found documentation to be testimonial 
in nature—Hopkins.219 In that case, the nurse did not testify but the 
prosecution sought to admit her report. There the court employed the 
objective-witness analysis rather than the business record exception.220 
F. Statements to Therapists and Counselors 
Statements made to therapists and counselors may or may not be 
testimonial based on a variety of circumstances.221 Such statements are 
more of a hybrid between multiple categories. These types of statements 
may also fall under medical personnel or prosecutorial categories, 
depending on the employment of the therapist. As the following case 
implies, courts could deal with statements to therapists in a number of ways. 
The Beadle court did not have the opportunity to directly address whether 
the child’s statements to a mental health clinician and to a therapist were 
testimonial because the issue was not raised on appeal.222 However, the 
court implicitly seemed to agree with a non-testimonial characterization, 
citing the mother’s role in getting both professionals involved in order to 
                                                                                                                              
 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 State v. Hopkins, 134 Wash. App. 1034 (2006). 
220 Id. at 791. 
221 See State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), where the court held that 
part of a victim’s interview with a social worker was testimonial and part of it was non-
testimonial. The social worker told the murder victim halfway through the interview that 
Child Protective Services would become involved because of the defendant’s violent 
propensities and the risk it posed to their child. Id. The court reasoned that because the 
victim was aware of possible prosecution from that point on, the later statements were 
testimonial. Id. 
222 State v. Beadle, 265 P.3d 863, 867 n.8 (2011). 
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begin the mental healing process for her daughter.223 Furthermore, the 
disclosure to the therapist was completely unprompted, and the girl by her 
own volition showedthe therapist on a doll where her assailant touched 
her.224 
VI. PROBLEMS WITH WASHINGTON’S CURRENT APPLICATION 
Even though a child’s statements of sexual abuse are unlikely to fall 
within the three categories of testimonial statements enumerated in 
Crawford, a court will likely categorize the statements as testimonial 
because of the nature of these cases. Under Crawford, testimonial 
statements are : (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, 
(2) extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
and (3) statements where an objective witness would reasonably believe the 
statement would be used in court. Because trauma from child sexual abuse 
is ongoing and pervasive,225 children who are unavailable to testify at trial 
due to said trauma were also likely unavailable before trial to give a proper 
affidavit, deposition, or sworn testimony. Like the victim in Beadle, 
children can be psychologically traumatized by the time a criminal 
investigation begins. Thus, these statements are unlikely to fit within the 
three Crawford categories. 
However, due to this trauma, children are likely to receive substantial 
assistance (whether by therapists, doctors, or law enforcement) during the 
criminal investigation process or at a child advocacy center. Therefore, 
many of the statements a child makes in that time will be categorized as 
testimonial’. 
                                                                                                                              
 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 866. 
225 See generally KAREN A. DUNCAN, HEALING FROM THE TRAUMA OF CHILDHOOD 
SEXUAL ABUSE (2004). 
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Washington state cases also contradict one another, and internal 
contradictions exist within cases as well. For example, in both Beadle and 
Shafer, the court drew a distinction between law enforcement officers acting 
in their official capacities and family friends not acting in their official 
capacities.226 This difference in results is inconsistent with the Beadle 
court’s holding that the Shafer test does not apply to law enforcement, albeit 
without overruling Shafer, because the court did in fact apply the test to this 
family friend who was a law enforcement official. The two factual cases are 
substantially the same, except for that the law enforcement in Shafer had a 
prior relationship to the child. However, this family friend took a recorded 
statement,227 used interrogation techniques and methods learned from law 
enforcement training,228 and prompted the child with questions long after 
becoming informed about the abuse,229 rather than an “in the moment” 
inquiry like the mother in Beadle.230 Additionally, Beadle argued that the 
presence of a CPS official while the police questioned the child was still 
testimonial.231 However, the Beadle opinion implies that if police had not 
been present and the CPS official was operating in her capacity as a 
guardian of the child’s welfare, the statement would have been non-
testimonial.232 
Generally, if the child’s guardian is willing to waive privilege and bring 
the counselor into court, these statements will be non-testimonial.233 
However, because child victims often seek counseling after the initiation of 
the prosecutorial process, it is possible, if not likely, that a court would be 
                                                                                                                              
 
226 See Beadle, 265 P.3d at 866; State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87, 89 (2006). 
227 Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 at 89. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Beadle, 265 P.3d at 866. 
231 Id. at 869. 
232 See id. 
233 See State v. Anderson, 254 P.3d 815, 818 (Wash. 2011). 
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hostile to these statements’ admissibility on the principle that the counselor 
and the guardian are aware of the pending trial. This issue has not been fully 
argued before the Washington appellate courts yet. 
If such an issue were to arise, the courts should look to the overall intent 
of the conversation. Unlike in Beadle, there would not be the presence of a 
law enforcement officer, nor would a law enforcement officer request the 
counseling similar to Hopkins. Rather, a therapist’s testimony would fall 
squarely in line with the facts of Shafer and the court would have to 
consider whether the child reasonably believed her statements in therapy 
would be used for prosecution. Moreover, even under a listener-centric 
regime, the therapist or counselor is occupationally driven to address the 
pain and trauma of the child, not to investigate and prosecute criminals. 
Simply being in contact with police or fulfilling mandatory reporting 
obligations should not wholly preclude this type of testimony as non-
testimonial.  
 
VII. PROPOSED CHANGES 
Because of the inconsistencies in both holding and reasoning among 
Washington courts, it is clear that either the state legislature or the state 
supreme court must provide clarity. Crawford is heavily criticized in the 
legal community, and there are several proposals to fix the problems it has 
caused.234 Attorney Andrew Eichner discusses the possibility of placing a 
large screen between the child victim and the defendant when the child 
                                                                                                                              
 
234 See generally Eichner, supra note 96 (outlining possible interpretations of Crawford 
that protect both the interests of the child victim and the defendant’s constitutional 
rights). 
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takes the stand.235 Alternatively, many states, including Washington,236 have 
enacted processes to allow testimony through closed-circuit, one-way 
televisions after this procedure was allowed in Maryland v. Craig.237 
Eichner argues that the Crawford interpretation of admissible statements is 
far too narrow and needs to be broadened to even the balance between 
victims and defendants.238 
 Another consideration is the rebuttable presumption test. Judge 
Advocate Major Rebecca K. Connally proposed that courts use a rebuttable 
presumption because it establishes a rule and creates avenues for exceptions 
to the rule.239 After the prosecution establishes the presumption that a 
statement is non-testimonial, the burden would shift to the defendant to 
prove the statement is testimonial.240 
Although the reliability of a statement is no longer the test of its 
admissibility, courts should make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the 
child-declarant is capable of making a testimonial statement.241 Specifically, 
the age of a child along with the circumstances of disclosure may render the 
child unable to “bear witness” in the formal sense that Crawford sought to 
exclude. 
Overall, a totality of the circumstances approach is the most just and 
equitable method for balancing the defendant’s rights and the interests of 
justice. By using a totality of the circumstances test, courts could take 
                                                                                                                              
 
235 Id. at 111–12 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (court ultimately held that the 
screen was a violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter,” but leaving 
open the possibility for other exceptions when public policy demanded such)). 
236 WASH. REV. CODE 9A.44.150 (2005). 
237 Eichner, supra note 96; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
238 Eichner  supra note 96, at 116. 
239 Maj. Rebecca K. Connally, “Out of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children 
Even Bear Testimony?, 2008-MAR ARMY LAW. 1, 20 (March 2008). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 4. 
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information about the nature of child sexual abuse and how it is often 
underreported into consideration, while still upholding the principles of 
Crawford. 
For example, if the substance of the statement was minimally accusatory 
or innocuous, a court could allow its admission under Crawford. Other 
jurisdictions have looked to the nature and substance of the child’s 
statement in determining its testimonial quality. Some courts have analyzed 
the degree of the statement’s accusatory nature, meaning statements that 
directly incriminate the defendant are subject to a higher level of 
confrontation scrutiny.242 Another relevant inquiry would be whether the 
statement falls under a hearsay exception, such as excited utterance, that 
diminishes the possibility of fabrication.243 This allows a court to determine 
whether the statement also falls under a hearsay exception under an 
evidentiary analysis as well as under a Confrontation Clause analysis. 
One court already used this totality of circumstances approach. Although 
the Alaska Court of Appeals has not directly addressed how the 
Confrontation Clause should be applied in sexual abuse cases, the court has 
used an “entirety of the circumstances” analysis.244 In contrast to 
Washington, this totality of the circumstances analysis allows Alaska courts 
to categorize statements made to social workers, like CPS workers, to be 
non-testimonial.245 John J. Gochnour proposed that the Alaska legislature 
codify these general rules into Alaska law in order to increase consistency 
and fairness of prosecutions, facilitate compliance with the Confrontation 
                                                                                                                              
 
242 See In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
243 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 2005 WL 171441 (2005). 
244 John J. Gochnour, The First Complaint: An Approach to the Admission of Child-
Hearsay Statements under the Alaska Rules of Evidence, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 71, 85 
(2010). 
245 Id. 
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Clause, and recognize the reliability and necessity of child hearsay 
testimony in child sexual abuse cases.246 
Similarly, adoption of a totality of the circumstances approach would 
help facilitate more fair and just results in Washington courts, which have 
used a variety of frameworks as compared to the unified framework used in 
Alaska courts. This action could be taken either by the Washington 
legislature or judiciary. Such legislation could take into account all of the 
factors and realities of child sexual abuse so when judges evaluate the 
admissibility of such statements, they are less inclined to be wedded to the 
four factors currently in force. 
Courts employing a totality of the circumstances approach would need to 
consider factors such as: the status and role of the listener (including what 
capacity that person was acting in at the time); the listener’s relationship to 
the child; the behavior of the child during the interaction; the substance of 
the statement (different parts maybe testimonial or non-testimonial); and the 
environment in which the statement was made.  
This list of factors is not exhaustive and shows the variety of 
circumstances and nuances that can be present in any child sexual abuse 
case. Given the gravity of emotional and psychological damage caused to 
all parties in child abuse cases, these cases are examples of how a specific 
crime needs to be considered in a Crawford analysis to truly understand the 
mental state of declarants and listeners. 
Additionally, government teams that aid in child sexual abuse cases, 
including law enforcement, child interview specialists, CPS workers, and 
counselors, are better equipped to maintain the accuracy and integrity of an 
out-of-court statement. Moreover, defendants have the ability to base their 
defense on the validity of the statement itself as well as the procedures and 
                                                                                                                              
 
246 Id. at 101–02. 
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circumstances under which the statement was made and observed by these 
government actors. 
Although the reliability of a statement is no longer the test of its 
admissibility, courts should make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the 
child-declarant is capable of making a testimonial statement.247 Specifically, 
the age of a child along with the circumstances of disclosure may render the 
child unable to “bear witness” in the formal sense that Crawford sought to 
exclude. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the confusion and inconsistencies caused by the Crawford 
decision, Washington has an opportunity to clarify these issues because the 
United States Supreme Court has failed to comprehensively define a test for 
determining testimonial statements. Washington should employ a totality of 
the circumstances test to clearly and fairly comprehend the complexities of 
each case. 
Given the inconsistencies in allowing some statements in child sexual 
abuse cases in Washington, immediate attention and solutions are 
necessary. Ever since the McMartin scandal discussed above and other 
controversies about false accusations of children, the law has responded by 
refusing to admit otherwise probative evidence in child sexual abuse cases. 
By addressing the sociological and psychological complexities in these 
cases in the law, courts can better evaluate the case and better serve the 
interests of justice and fairness. 
Additionally, the Crawford framework in Washington needs to be clear 
for practitioners to understand how the system works in order to advocate 
                                                                                                                              
 
247 Maj. Rebecca K. Connally, “Out of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children 
Even Bear Testimony?, 2008-MAR ARMY LAW. 1, 4 (Mar. 2008). 
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for their clients. There must be a workable, yet fair system for judges to 
apply to the facts, thus supplying them with the necessary tools to balance 
between the defendant’s constitutional rights and the interests of the 
prosecution, the victim, and the community in each specific case. Without 
clearing up these issues, litigants will be subject to the ebb and flow of 
judicial scrutiny of which framework to apply. It will be extremely difficult 
if not impossible for these attorneys to properly argue issues for a judge 
whom may take an approach different from what the attorney has 
researched. Lastly, this system is necessary for judicial economy and 
fairness: providing each case a fresh look at the facts, and then applying the 
law. In the current regime, there have been and there will continue to be 
misapplication and inconsistent rulings. In the end, the people of 
Washington would collectively be better served because a shift in 
application of Crawford would allow cases like child sexual abuse to be 
fully remedied by the laws that seek to prevent it. 
